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IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS, IMPERFECT LABOR MOBILITY,
AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION
WITH DECENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP
Arthur J. Caplan and Emilson C.D. Silva

ABSTRACT

We examine the noncooperative provision of an impure public good by regional
governments in a federation similar to the European Union, where regional governments are
Stackelberg leaders and the central government is a Stackelberg follower-a federation with
decentralized leadership. The center redistributes income and provides budget-balanced
lump-sum matching grants after it observes the regions' contributions to the impure public good.
Imperfectly mobile workers react to regional and central governments' policies by establishing
residence in their most preferred region. Despite the degree of labor mobility, we show that the
allocation of the impure public good and the interregional income redistribution policy are
generally efficiently in a federation with decentralized leadership.

Key words: decentralized leadership; federation; redistribution; labor mobility; matching grants

IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS, IMPERFECT LABOR MOBILITY,
AND MATCHING GRANTS IN A FEDERATION
WITH DECENTRALIZED LEADERSHIP

I. Introduction
In what was the first model of a federation with imperfect labor mobility (or regional

attachment benefits) and spillover-inducing public good provision, Wellisch (1994) shows that at
least one region under-supplies the pubic good. As Wellisch himself says: "In the case of
imperfect mobility, regions disagree about their objectives since the migration equilibrium can
no longer be characterized by equal utilities in each region. At least one (of two) regions cannot
achieve its desired resource distribution within the federation, and this region has no incentives
to provide a socially efficient level of public goods generating spillovers. The decentralized Nash
equilibrium is inefficient." This inefficiency result is important mostly because it has extended to
the case of imperfect labor mobility Oates' (1972) seminal argument that central government
intervention can enhance efficiency in the face of spillovers. However, it leaves unanswered the
questions of which policy instruments and what type of hierarchical structures are capable of
achieving a socially efficient allocation of public good provision within such a federation.
Caplan et al. (2000) have provided one possible answer for the case of pure public goods.
They show that, irrespective of the degree of labor mobility, a federation characterized by
"decentralized leadership" generally implements efficient public good policies. In this
framework, decentralized leadership means that the central government makes interregional
income transfers after it observes the contributions to the pure public good made by the regional
governments. By pre-committing to their public good contributions in anticipation of the
center's interregional income policy and subsequent labor mobility, each region therefore has no
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incentive to deviate from the socially efficient allocation in the resulting sub-game perfect
equilibrium. 1 This result shows that the transfers implemented by the center induce both
regional governments to face their personalized Lindahl prices, and that the center is therefore
able to completely nullify the incentives of the regional governments to neglect each other's
contribution to the pure public good. Left unanswered by Caplan et ai., however, is the question
of whether or not this type of decentralized leadership is strong enough to implement efficient
policies for impure public goods. The present paper answers this question in the affirmative, but
only when the central government is provided with an additional policy instrument - lump-sum
subsidies in the form of matching grants.
The previous literature on impure public goods (or what is commonly referred to as
"impure altruism") provides a precedent for matching-grant subsidies. However, this literature
has been primarily concerned with the issue of neutrality, not efficiency per se. Thus, the main
question motivating this vein of research is which set of policies might alter the regions ' (or
individuals', if we are talking about charitable donations) Nash behavior when it comes to the
provision of public goods? In the case of pure public good provision, where individuals are
affected only by the aggregate level of the public good and each individual provides a positive
level of the public good, Warr (1982) showed that the level of provision is unaffected by a lumpsum redistribution of income. In other words, the public good is neutral with respect to lumpsum taxes and transfers that flow from the central government. 2 However, as Warr shows, perunit consumption taxes and subsidies on public good contributions will raise the total level of
provision by affecting the individuals' marginal incentives to donate, and could in fact lead to a
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long as the regional governments each provide positive amounts of the public good.

2Bergstrom et al. (1986) later showed that this neutrality result does not in general hold when at least one
individual provides nothing to the public good.
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Pareto optimum if the tax and subsidy rates are set with full information of the necessary
condition for Pareto optimality, an exceedingly difficult task. 3
Boadwayet al. (1989), and Andreoni (1989, 1990) have extended the work ofWarr in
two important respects. Boadway et al. show that Warr's neutrality result is robust to an
economy with pre-existing tax and subsidy distortions. Further, they find that differential
per-unit subsidies across agents (rather than Warr's uniform rates) are not only non-neutral, but
also have the surprising effect of decreasing the welfare of the agent who receives an increased
subsidy, while increasing the welfare of the agent whose tax is increased. 4 Andreoni (1989,
1990) is the first to analyse the issue of neutrality for the class of impure public goods-goods
which have both "altruistic" and "egoistic" (or "warm glow") components. He finds that
neutrality generally does not hold for the case of impure public goods, a result that is consistent
with findings from the empirical literature on public goods. The reasoning behind this result is
that the warm glow effect makes private contributions imperfect substitutes for contributions
from other sources, such as public good provision from other contributors or taxes and subsidies
from the central government. As Andreoni shows, perfect substitutability is sufficient for
neutrality. Without perfect substitutability of contributions, "transfers of income to the more
altruistic from the less altruistic will increase the equilibrium supply of the public good"
(Andreoni, 1990). These income transfers may take the form of direct or matching grants
financed by lump-sum taxation; however, matching grants Pareto dominate direct grants.

3Bernheim (1986) was able to reverse WaIT's non-neutrality result for per-unit taxes and subsidies in a
sequential equilibrium setting similar to ours. However, in Bernheim's model, the central government provides the
public good in the fmal stage, after the individuals have made their private-good choices. In our case, the
individuals (i.e., regions) make their public good choices prior to the central government's choice of taxes and
subsidies.
4Boadway et al. (1989) are the fIrst to adopt a federation, rather than a collection of individuals, as their
framework for analysis in this vein of research.
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While this more recent literature on impure public goods has clearly identified the
properties and behavioral assumptions underlying the neutrality hypothesis, it has not adequately
answered the question of which policy instruments and hierarchical structures are necessary to

completely reverse the neutrality result. In other words, how do we move beyond Pareto
dominant outcomes for impure public good provision to the complete set of Pareto efficient
solutions?
This paper analyses the class of impure public goods, as modelled by Andreoni (1989,
1990), within the framework of a federation, as in Boadway et al. (1989). However, the
federation's hierarchical structure follows that of Caplan et al. (2000). In general, federations are
complex hierarchical organizations that are typically characterized by the coexistence of
governments at the central, regional (i.e., state or province) and local levels. In each level of the
federal hierarchy, a government is usually endowed with a set of policy instruments, which is
utilized to foster its own objectives. Regional and local governments provide many public
services and goods. In many instances, however, the economic jurisdiction of a public good
provided regionally or locally exceeds the political jurisdiction of a regional or local government.
Impure public goods, such as abatement of a pollutant with both intra- and transboundary
properties and infrastructure projects, provide good examples of commodities whose economic
jurisdiction, being the entire federation, encompasses all regional political jurisdictions. Income
redistribution, another important type of service which is often provided regionally, may also
generate interregional externalities.
In the United States, the central government's income-redistribution policy typically
redistributes income across individuals regardless their regions of residence. In the European
Union (E.U.), on the other hand, the center redistributes income amongst the national
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governments that constitute the federation. The member nations subsequently redistribute
income amongst their own residents. Wildasin (1991) shows that "when households are mobile
among jurisdictions, income redistribution by individual jurisdictions create fiscal externalities"
(p. 757). Similarly, Epple and Romer (1991) find that local redistribution induces sorting of the
population, "with the poorest households located in the communities that provide most
redistribution" (p. 828).
We consider three governmental regimes. We first examine a completely decentralized
regime ala Wellisch (1994), where each region independently controls the level of the transfer
that it makes to the other region. Next, we examine a regime where the central authority controls
all policy instruments. This provides a useful benchmark for future comparison. Given our
assumption about the center's objective function-a weighted sum of the regional governments'
objective functions-we will be able, in the benchmark situation, to derive the entire set of
Pareto efficient allocations. The remaining regime, denoted decentralized leadership, is
characterized by the assumption that the central authority is solely endowed with an instrument
to make interregional income transfers, and, later, lump-sum matching grants. This will represent
our characterization of a federal regime in this paper. Both levels of government share
responsibility over federal policy making, namely, the central government controls the federal
income- redistribution and subsidy policies and the regional governments, behaving
noncooperatively, jointly determine the public good policy.
In this federal regime, the regional authorities are Stackelberg leaders and the central
authority is a Stackelberg follower. This seems to be a fair representation of the E.U. federation,
where the governments of the member nations have historically precommitted to their own
public good policies-the environmental policies of the member nations provide good
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examples-and the central government, through the Maastricht Treaty, has been endowed with
significant power to redistribute income amongst the member nations after it observes these
nations' public good policies-i.e., the interregional income transfers implemented with
resources of the E.D. 's Structural Funds. The allocation of the Structural Funds obeys the
"additionality" principle, whereby the center's role is restricted to the provision of additional
resources to help member nations to execute their own policies-such as infrastructure
development and pollution abatement.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy in the context of a
completely decentralized federation, where regions playa Nash game and have control over both
provision of the public good and interregional transfers. Similar to Wellisch (1994) we show
that while the Nash solution is efficient with respect to population distribution, it is inefficient
with respect to the allocation of public good provision. As mentioned above, we examine and
compare two other governmental regimes: a fully centralized (our benchmark allocation) regime
and a federal regime with decentralized leadership. Section 3 is devoted to the fully centralized,
Pareto efficient solution. Section 4 considers the decentralized leadership regime where the
central government retains control over income redistribution policy. In this section we show
that the center's income redistributive authority is not sufficient to restore the Pareto efficient
allocation of public good provision across the two regions. Section 5 considers the decentralized
leadership game where the center retains control over both income redistribution and lump-sum
matching grants. In this section we show that lump-sum matching grants, financed by budgetbalanced lump-sum taxation, restore the efficient allocation of public good provision that was
lost in the Nash equilibrium. In each section, labor will be assumed to be imperfectly mobile, a
characterization of the E. D. 's common labor market. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. The Decentralized Nash Equilibrium
Imagine a federation with two regions, indexed by j,j

=

1,2, two regional governments

and one central government. There are N individuals in the federation. The population ofregionj
is denoted nj. Assume that 0 < nj < 1 and N = 4nj = 1, implying that n2 = 1 - nj. The utility of
the representative resident ofregionj,j
Vi

where ui,j

=

=

1,2, is assumed to be
if the household lives in 1,

={ul(XpqpQ)+a(N -n),
2
U (X 2,q2,Q)+an,

if the household lives in 2.

(1)

1,2, is strictly concave and increasing in all arguments, where Xj is the consumption

of the private (or numeraire) good, qj denotes the amount of public good provided by regionj
(i.e., the "egoistic" component of welfare), and Q

=

4 qj represents the aggregate amount of the

public good, or the "altruistic" component of welfare. 5 As in Wellisch (1994), the parameter n
measures the psychic benefit a household derives from living in region 2 and the parameter (N n) the benefit from living in region 1. Thus, households with relatively small n' s are at home in

region 1, while households with relatively large n's are at home in region 2. The parameter a (a.
0) expresses the degree of heterogeneity in tastes for a region. The larger is a, the greater the

intensity of psychic attachment to a respective region.
Each resident ofregionj is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied at region}.
Workers are assumed to be identically productive and are employed in the production of the
numeraire good. The production possibilities for the numeraire good are represented by a strictly
concave production function pj(nj; LJJ

=

jj (nJJ, where Lj denotes the fixed resource endowment

ofregionj, say land. Since workers are identically productive and are all employed in the

5The curvature conditions on zI, as well as on! discussed below, ensure concave programming problems
for each of the cases considered below. Thus, sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied for each of the
maximization problems considered below.
.
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production of the numeraire good, we assume that each individual's total return from the
productive activity in region} is jj (n)lnjThe numeraire good is not only used for consumption, but also as an input in the
production of the impure public good, at a constant marginal cost of 1. Regional government)
can therefore produce qj units of the public good at a total cost of qj- Further, we assume that
relative prices do not change, and that units of all commodities are chosen so that their prices are
equal to 1. 6 Each resident of region},}

XI

ql+r -r

l
2
+ ---=----=--------=nl

x2

r

r

q2+ 2- l
+ -=-=--..:::.-~
n2

=

1,2, faces the following budget constraint:

if the household lives in 1,

j=1,2,

(2)

if the household lives in 2.

where for each }, the right-hand side shows the resident's total expenditure and the left-hand side
gives his total income. The representative resident of region} pays an amount of 1)lnj to region}, and receives an amount of 7-jlnj from region-j.
Households are free to choose where they will reside. Since they differ in their
attachment to a region, the migration equilibrium is characterized by the marginal household,
identified by nj, which is indifferent between locating in either region. Substituting (2) into (1),
and recalling n2 = 1 - nj, the migration equilibrium may therefore be expressed as:
(3)

Thus, nj also represents the number of households residing in region 1.

6As

prices.

noted in Boadway et al. (1989), linear production technology assures both constant marginal costs and
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Equation (3) detennines

nj

as an implicit function of the regional control variables (qj, 1)}

j=1,2. Thus, total differentiation of(3) enables a full cataloguing of the various migration-

response functions that will prove useful in the remaining analysis of this section:

(4a)

(4b)

1

Ux
2
-+u
-u 1 -u 1
on
n
Q
q
Q
__
I = ---=-1_ _ _ __
oql
D

(4c)

2

U

2

U

2

1

x
+uq ---u
Q
n
Q
2

(4d)

D

I
2
h
were
uxnl
+ uxnl

-

2 a -- D<Oan
d uj
xnl

j
_ U x ( I" j
) 7
- J n - Xj •

.
.
The mequahty
D < 0 ensures a stable

nj

migration equilibrium. It says that starting at the equilibrium, any possible gains in the value of
net social marginal product that might be realized with an additional individual residing in region
1 are more than offset by lost attachment benefits. Further, the inequalities in (4a) and (4d)
demonstrate that the number of residents moving to region 1 is decreasing in the level of that
region's transfer to region 2, and increasing in the level of region 2's transfer to region 1. In
addition, migration responses to the levels of qj depend upon the relative strengths of the
respective egoistic and altruistic components for each respective region.

7 The

subscripts on functions u i and I represent the partial derivatives with respect to the variable indicated.
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Regionj's problem is to choose (qj, 1)} to maximize its welfare (1) subject to (2) and
response functions (4a)-(4d), taking as given {q-j, 7-j}. The first-order conditions for these
problems are:
rj ~o and

ou

j

r .--=O
J

or.J

j =1,2,

(5)

(6)

u~
2
2
2
on1 •
--+uq +uQ -u xnl;::)
--=0
n2

(7)

uq2

As shown in Appendix 1, combining equations (5) yields for the socially efficient
population distribution:

_ 2an2 2 <
(1'1 -x )_( 1'2 -x ) < 2an1
In
1
In
2 1
•
Ux

(8)

Ux

To see that (8) implies the efficient population distribution, consider first the perfect
mobility case (a

= 0).

In this case, /,,1 - XI

= /,,2 -

X2 '

which is a traditional result indicating that

net benefits of additional households to regions must be equalized across regions (Wildasin,
1986). Ifhouseholds are imperfectly mobile (a > 0), then there is a range of efficient allocations
that vary with respect to the weights of a utilitarian social welfare function, as will be shown in
Section 3. The population distribution indicated by (8) is a direct result of the equal-utility
migration equilibrium (3), which induces each region to maximize the common utility level of all
households in the federation.

11

Equations (6) and (7) yield for the following inefficient allocation of the public goods:

-j

2 a- -Ux
n- }·

j

(t,-n j -x_j )

= 1,2 .

(9)

Equations (9) imply

(10)

or that the regions do not provide the public good up to the point where their respective private
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) are equated. As will be shown in the next section, equal
private MRS's is a necessary condition for the Pareto efficient provision of the public good.
Otherwise, a reallocation of the public good could occur which would make both regions better
off. Thus, the decentralized Nash solution is inefficient.

3. Pareto Efficiency
We assume the following objective function for the center: 8
W ( Xl' X 2 , ql , q 2 )

We further assume that

e

= ()u I ( Xl , ql , Q) + (1 - e) u 2 ( X 2 , q2 , Q)

(11)

(0,1). The parameter e corresponds to the weight put on

region 1's welfare by the center. We assume that this parameter is determined exogenously by
egalitarian, institutional or political considerations. For a fixed
allocation by choosing {Xj, qJJj =

1,2

e, we can obtain an efficient

to maximize (11) subject to (3) and the aggregate resource

constraint for the federation:

8Even though (11) ignores individual attachment benefits, its maximization subject to (3), which includes
individual attachment benefits, characterizes a Pareto efficient allocation for a given weight B. Any change in
location must be accompanied by an increase in either u l or u2 ; otherwise it would not be made. This
straightforward revealed preference argument explains why a Pareto efficient allocation must maximize (11) (see,
e.g., Wellisch(1994, p.171)).
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(12)
The set of Pareto efficient allocations, excluding the efficient allocations associated with

e = 0 and e = 1, can then be derived by straightforward application of the envelope theorem,
namely, by varying

e between 0 and 1 and computing the efficient allocation associated with

each particular e value.
As shown in Appendix 2, for a fixed

e an efficient allocation is characterized by (3), (8),

(12) and the following equations, provided the solution is interior:

j

= 1,2

(13)

.

Equations (13) are the familiar Samuelson condition for efficient provision of the pure
public good. It says that the sum of the MRS's between the public and private goods in
consumption should equal the marginal rate of transformation between these two goods in
production. Unlike for the Nash equilibrium, equations (13) imply

(14)

or that the regions provide the public good up to the point where their respective private MRS's
are equated. Thus, equations (8) and (14) are the benchmark conditions for Pareto efficiency.

4. Decentralized Leadership with Central Control
of Income Redistribution
As in Caplan et al. (2000), we initially consider a three-stage game whereby the regional
governments, acting as Stackelberg leaders, precommit by selecting their contributions to the
public good prior to the interregional income redistribution policy of the center. The center
determines its interregional income redistribution policy in the second stage of the game, after
observing the public good contributions chosen by the regional governments and in anticipation
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of location choices made by residents. Residents make their location choices after they observe
both contributions to the public good and interregional redistributions of income.
Formally, the timing for the game is as follows: 9

Stage 1: Regional government 1 chooses q1 to maximize u 1(Xl, ql, ql + q2) + a(1- nl) subject to
X1 = Xl(ql, q2) and nl = n21(Xl(ql, q2), X2(ql, q2), ql, q2). Regional government 2 chooses q2 to
maximize u 2 (X2, q2, q 1 + q2) + anI subject to X2 = X2(q 1, q2) and n1 = n21(Xl(q1, q2), X2(Q 1, Q2), Q1,
Q2). Each regional government takes the other regional government's choice as given.
Stage 2: The center observes {Ql, Q2} and chooses (XJ1j=I,2 to maximize (10) subject to (11) and
nl = n21(Xl(Ql, Q2), X2(Ql, Q2), Ql, Q2).
Stage 3: After observing the choices made in stages 1 and 2, residents select their preferred
residential locations.
The migration equilibrium equation (3) enables us to define the implicit function for
stage three: 10
(15)
Assuming an interior solution, we obtain the following first order conditions in the
center's maximization problem: 11

(16a)

(16b)

where A> 0 is the shadow value of an additional unit of aggregate income for the federation.
Combining (16a) with (16b) yields the efficient population distribution condition (8). We next
utilize (12) to define the implicit function:
9The implicit migration-response function for nj displays a superscript "2" in order to distinguish it from
the migration-response function utilized in the Nash game of Section 2.

10The corresponding explicit functions for (15), along with all other derivations for this section are
included in Appendix 3.
llWe assume that the local sufficient second order condition is satisfied in the maximization problem of the
second stage.
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(17)
In the first stage of the game, the regional governments choose their contributions to the

public good taking into account the implicit functions (15) and (17). Assuming that (q) >

OJ; = J, 2,

the first order conditions that characterize the Nash equilibrium in the first stage for regions 1
and 2, respectively, are as follows: 12
(18a)

(18b)

results in following conditions governing the allocations of the impure public good in regions 1
and 2, respectively:
(19a)

(19b)

Combining (19a) with (19b) yields (10). The results for the decentralized leadership game with
central control over income redistribution policy are summarized in Proposition 1:

Proposition 1: Given our modelling assumptions, the subgame perfect equilibria for the
decentralized leadership game are inefficient, provided that (q) > OJ; = J, 2 .

12We assume that the sufficient second-order conditions are satisfied in the maximization problems of the
first stage.

15
Proposition 1 departs from the result for pure public goods in Caplan et al. (2000), where
it was found that the central government' s income-redistribution policy under decentralized
leadership is adequate to ensure the efficient allocation of public good provision across regions.
Here, the center's income redistribution policy-associated, for example, with the
implementation of structural and cohesion policies in the European Union-does not obey the
principle of complete "additionality," whereby the central government offers enough additional
resources to advance to a social optimum the structural and cohesion policies designed and
executed by national governments. Proposition 1 says that, when the center's sole policy
instrument is income redistribution in response to regional policies-such as the structural and
cohesion policies-imperfect labor mobility and the impureness of the public good, inherent
characteristics of the E.U. 's economy, are impediments for efficient policy making at the
regional governmental level.
Intuitively, Proposition 1 holds because the egoistic components of the impure good are
not fully internalized in each region prior to location decisions. As we discussed in the
Introduction, Wellisch (1994) teaches us that household attachment matters for efficiency only if
location choices are made in the presence of transboundary externalities. In our decentralized
leadership game, the interregional redistribution policy of the center does not have enough power
to completely nullify the regional governments' incentives to underprovide the public good.
Therefore, when it comes time for individuals to decide where they should establish their
residences, in the third stage of the game, the externalities have not been fully internalized.
An immediate implication of this intuitive argument is that any subgame perfect equilibrium
with positive contributions is inefficient regardless the degree of labor mobility:
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Theorem 1: For the decentralized leadership game, any subgame perfect equilibrium with
positive contributions is inefficient regardless of the level at which residents are attached to
regIons.
Proof: In light of Proposition 1 we need only prove that any subgame perfect equilibrium, with
positive contributions, for the decentralized leadership game is inefficient when a = 0. If a = 0,
the first order conditions of the first stage reduce to:

(20a)

(20b)

Equations (20a) and (20b) imply (10) .•

5. Decentralized Leadership with Central Control of Income Redistribution and Lump
Sum Matching Grants
As in Comes and Silva (2000), assume that the central government can now make lumpsum matching grants to each region, denoted mj, M

=

4m) 0, j=i,2. Each region funds the

matching grants program with budget-balanced lump-sum taxes to the central government,
denoted 9

=

mj, 49

=

M. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint may now be rewritten as:

(21)
where Pj

=

qj + mj and P

=

4Pj,j=i,2. Similar to the previous game in Section 4, we consider a

three-stage game whereby the regional governments, acting as Stackelberg leaders, precommit
by selecting their contributions to the public good prior to the interregional income redistribution
and matching grant policies of the center. The center determines its policies in the second stage
of the game, after observing the public good contributions chosen by the regional governments
and in anticipation of location choices made by residents. Residents make their location choices
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after they observe contributions to the public good, interregional redistributions of income, and
matching grants.
The migration equilibrium condition with matching grants in now expressed as UI(XI, PI,
P) + a(1 - nI)

2

= U (X2, P2,

P) + anI, which, after substitution of (21) for Xl, may be re-expressed

as:

(22)

Equation (22) defines the implicit migration response functions: 13
(23)
In stage two, the central government chooses both x) and m), j= 1,2 to maximize its

utilitarian social welfare function. Note that when the central government chooses m),j=1,2,
each region's contribution to the public good is already pre-determined. Since the central
government takes Q),j=1,2, as given and chooses m),j=1,2, it in fact choosesp),j=1,2. Hence,
the problem faced by the central government in the second stage of the game is to choose {X2,
P)1i=I,2 to

maximize:
(24)

subject to (23). As Appendix 4 shows, this problem yields conditions (8) and (13) directly,
which implies (14). Since this result holds for any a

~O,

it may be re-stated in the following

theorem.

Theorem 2: For the decentralized leadership game with lump-sum matching grants, any
subgame perfect equilibrium with positive contributions is Pareto efficient regardless of the level
at which residents are attached to regions.

13 The corresponding explicit functions, along with all other derivations for this section, are included in
Appendix 4.
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The intuition behind Theorem 2 is as follows. First, the center's choice of Xj ensures the
efficient population distribution by removing any incentives that residents might have in relocating to obtain a higher income level. In other words, because they realize that the center's
income redistribution policy has endogenized their responses, the residents have no better option
than to distribute themselves efficiently across the two regions. Second, by choosing its
matching-grant policy after the regions' choices of public good provision, the center effectively
controls both the aggregate and regional amounts of the public good that will ultimately be
produced. Knowing this, the regions' choices in the initial stage are essentially redundant.
Similar to their choices of how to distribute themselves with respect to population, the regions
have no better option than to choose the efficient allocation of the public good, even though the
public good provides 'impure' benefits. Thus, lump-sum matching grants promote the correct
incentives, and thereby induce the regions to equalize their private MRS's between the numeraire
and public goodS. 14
This result is striking for yet another reason. Previous work by Boadway et al. (1989)
concluded that lump-sum matching grants are neutral, in that they leave unchanged the level of
the public good in the new Nash equilibrium. Andreoni (1990) also found that lump-sum grants,
funded by lump-sum taxation, are neutral for impure public goods. Only with per-unit subsidies
was he able to find non-neutrality. These results are therefore in direct contrast to our's. Not
only are lump-sum grants non-neutral, but they are capable of restoring Pareto efficiency in a
federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility. Thus, we have also found

14The comparative static solutions behind Theorem 2 also yield additional insight into this general result.
For the case ofM ;4), aMiaQ = -1 , ac/a~ = -1, ac/aq_j = O,j=1,2. Thus, the central government's optimal matching
grants policy reduces each region's lump-sum tax one-for-one for each additional unit of public good provision by
the regions.
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a corrective policy for the type of inefficiency first encountered by Wellisch (1994) in his model
of a federation.

6. Conclusions

We have shown that in a federation such as the European Union, characterized by
decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility, regional provision of impure public goods
may be Pareto efficient. Theorem 2, indeed, tells us that a decentralized leadership game,
whereby regional governments precommit to contributions to an impure public good in
anticipation of the center's interregional income and matching grant policies and subsequent
labor mobility, has efficient subgame perfect equilibria as long as the regional governments
provide positive amounts of the public good. This important result does not depend on the
regional attachment benefits derived by the residents of the federation.
This result extends several branches of the public goods literature. For instance, it
extends the Comes and Silva (2000) result for matching grants to the case of imperfect labor
mobility. It extends the Wellisch (1994) and Caplan et al. (2000) results to the case of impure
public goods. It also extends the work on neutrality by Boadway et al. (1989) and Andreoni
(1989, 1990) by qualifying the role that a federation's structural hierarchy can play in
'neutralizing the effects of neutrality' by inducing an efficient provision of public goods in a
decentralized leadership setting.
The standard assumption that all income generated within a region accrues only to
residents of that region, on an equal per-capita basis, is employed here to derive all results. An
interesting avenue for future work would be to consider situations whereby migrants retain
possession of their non-human wealth when they move from one place to another, since this
appears to be ubiquitous. In such an extension, migrants and non-migrants would typically be
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heterogeneous, a factor that may generate pecuniary externalities and diversity of incentives
within regions. Our intuition, however, tells us that our main result-Theorem 2-would remain
valid in this more complex setting, since the interregional policies of the center would induce the
regional governments to adopt policies that maximize the federation's total income. Therefore,
all externalities would be completely internalized and individual wealth levels would not be
sensitive to migration decisions.
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Appendix 1
To derive (8), begin with (5) for region 1. Substitute (4a) into (5) and rearrange to get:

2an
(1
--2 2<
I' -x1 )In
Ux

(2
I' -x )
In

2·

(AI)

Similarly for region 2, substitute (4b) into (5) and rearrange to get:
(A2)

Bring (AI) and (A2) together to get (8). Substituting (4c) into (6) and rearranging yields (9) for
region 1, and substituting (4d) into (7) and rearranging likewise yields (9) for region 2 . •

Appendix 2
The center chooses

{Xl, X2,

q],

Q2,

nd to maximize the Lagrangian:

The first-order conditions for this problem are:

(BI)
(B2)

eu~ + eU~ + (1- e)U~ - A + tp ( U~ + U~ - U~ ) = 0,

(B3)

eu~ + (1- e)U: + (1- e)U~ - A + tp ( U~ - U: - U~ ) = 0 ,

(B4)
(B5)

Equations (B 1) and (B2) imply
1

Ux

n1

2

(e+ tp) =~(l-e - tp).
n2

(B6)
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Successive substitution of (B1) into (B3) and then (B6) results in (13) for region 1. Similar
manipulations of (B2), (B4), and (B6) results in (13) for region 2. Solving (B1) and (B2) for A
and 'IF yields, respectively,
(B7)

(B8)

Substituting (B7) and (B8) into (B5) yields (8) .•

Appendix 3
A straightforward exercise in comparative statics yields the following migration response
functions from (3):
(C1)

(C2)

(C3)

(C4)

Similarly, total differentiation of (12), accounting for (15), yields the following incomeredistribution response functions:

(C5)
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(C6)

IJx 2

=

(

u~ - ~~ - u~ J(

Xl - X

2

_ - - 0 . . . -_ _ _-----'-_ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ ~~ ( x, - x, + I.' -

8 q,

-~(x
2a 1 -X2 + J/,2n

-

I.' )+ n,

/'l)+n

Jn

U~2a- U~ J(Xi - x, + I. - I.
2

= _(

I)

=

2

+1
(C9)

IJQ

IJx2
IJQ

(C7)

(C8)

2

8 x,

+ In2 - 1,,1 ) + 1

(

u~ 2a
- u~ J(

Xl - X 2

+ In2 - I"1 ) + 1
(CI0)

Substituting (C5)-(CI0) into the expressions for 4,j=1,2 proves that (19a) and (19b) yield (10) .

•
Appendix 4
A straightforward exercise in comparative statics yields the following migration response
functions from (22):

(Dl)
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]

2

(]

] )

on] = Ux +n]up -n] Up +up

op]
on1

OP2
where D = u! (In1 -

In + x x]) - 2an
2

2 -

1

D

2)
= Ux1-n1u p] + n] (2
Up +Up
D

(D2)

(D3)

< 0 for a stable migration equilibrium. In the second

stage, maximization of (24) with respect to {X2, PJh=J,2 and subject to (22) and (D1) - (D3) yields
(13) and thus (14) .•
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